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Abstract: A Comment on a Recent Work by Heinz Steinert on Max Weber.
The article is a comment on a recent book concerning Weber’s Protestant 
Ethic thesis by Heinz Steinert. After producing a summary of its contents, the 
article raises a number of objections to Steinert’s critical comments, bearing 
in particular on the clarity, methodological correctness and historical accu-
racy of the Weber’s thesis; and also on the adequacy of the arguments produ-
ced by the secondary literature on this thesis. The article concludes by calling 
into question Steinert’s scholarship in a number of fields that are related to it, 
such as theology, history, and his knowledge and understanding of Weber’s 
own works. Finally, Steinert’s contention that there was a bourgeois cultural 
hegemony in Fin-de-siècle Vienna is shown to be untenable. 
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The late Austrian sociologist Heinz Steinert (1942–2011) will be perhaps remem-
bered for his contributions to sociological criminology or the sociology of the cul-
ture industry; hardly, however, as a Weberian scholar or as an expert on theology. 
Still, his last work purports and purposes to be an assessment of the well-known 
Weber thesis of a causal relation between the introjection, on the part of bourgeois 
and petty bourgeois strata, of what Weber called the Protestant ethic, on the one 
hand; and the rise of Western capitalism on the other. It should be remarked before-
hand that the Author was  – like his fellow Catholic religion scholars, Felix Rach-
fahl (1867–1925) and Werner Stark (1909–1985) – critical of the so-called Weber- 
Troeltsch thesis. But – in contrast to Stark, who considered Weber along with Durk-
heim still a most significant figure in this field of studies1– Steinert’s unrelenting criti-
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cism has questioned Weber’s relevance to our times, while confining him to his own 
historical, social and cultural times.2 In this comment, Steinert’s work will be first 
presented in some detail, and then evaluated in terms of its argumentation cogency.
A Recapitulation of Steinert’s work on Weber
The main title of this work – Max Webers unwiderlegbare Fehlkonstruktionen (Max 
Weber’s unconfutable and erroneous constructions) – does no justice to its content; 
for it is precisely a lengthy attempt to confute the Weber’s thesis by using a variety 
of epistemological and historical arguments. A summary of Steinert’s work will be 
here reported; it will be commented upon later. That Weber’s thesis is immune to 
confutation attempts is argued as follows: Any confutation attempt has been dis-
missed as the result of misunderstandings, or can be answered by some reformu-
lation of this thesis. The thesis itself – as Steinert concludes – is therefore unclearly 
and contradictorily formulated. There are, moreover, significant differences between 
the 1904/1905 and the 1920 editions of this work; in particular, only the latter could 
consider some critical discussions, which the former edition had elicited. 
Max Weber’s question – in Steinert’s view – was whether a spirit of capitalism 
originating from ascetic Protestantism had any significance for the rise of capita-
lism. Steinert finds this thesis objectionable from a methodological viewpoint; for, 
the economically and educationally privileged position of Protestants could have 
resulted from other causes, such as a higher proportion of them, as compared to 
Catholics, living in urban centers and other areas in which education was relatively 
high. Further, the statistical tables produced by Weber contain computational mis-
takes. It is, moreover, conceivable that the causal relationship could be reversed, to 
the effect that ascetic Protestantism originated from privileged strata. As Steinert 
remarks, Weber himself had close family, cultural, and social connections with Ger-
man Protestantism. Weber’s research on the Protestant origins of capitalism is rela-
ted to the political and cultural orientation of German Protestant intellectuals.
The concept of the spirit of capitalism is essential to his thesis, and yet Weber 
provides only the instance of Benjamin Franklin as the embodiment of such a spi-
rit. According to Steinert, this instance is not correct for several reasons. One objec-
tion is philological. Weber’s interpretation of the original text by Franklin is given 
as self-evident; the text itself has been inaccurately cited. Steinert calls attention to a 
few passages drawn from Franklin’ work, and quoted by Weber. As Steinert shows, 
Weber either added emphasis to, or omitted or otherwise modified them. A second 
objection is substantive. As Steinert contends, Franklin provided no moral teaching, 
for the theme and concept of work as a profession are absent in Franklin’s work; but 
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merely practical advice on the conduct most suitable to life enjoyment. Benjamin 
Franklin, as Steinert sees him, was rather a statesman and supporter of the American 
Revolution and a cultivated representative of the American Enlightenment.
Franklin’s economic success was the result of good social connections, rather 
than of capitalistic virtues such as industriousness and diligence. On the other hand, 
Jacob Fugger, a pious Catholic, was a much better instance than Benjamin Franklin 
of an entrepreneur permeated by a capitalist spirit, or business mind, driving him 
to the pursuit of gain without ethical or religious constraints.3 The origin of the spi-
rit of capitalism was not therefore embodied in the life and deeds of Protestant figu-
res such as Franklin. As Steinert observes, Catholic countries and regions also pro-
vide examples of rationalism, as evidenced by their reception of Roman law. What 
is more, Weber does not clarify the relations, historical or otherwise, between tra-
ditional and rational capitalism. The debate on the origins of capitalism, which was 
conducted within the fold of German economists of Weber’s time, is mentioned in 
this connection.
Steinert touches on the contributions by Sombart, Brentano, and Schmoller, and 
concludes that the causal relevance of the Protestant ethic – as emphasized by Weber 
and Troeltsch – cannot be found in the writings of the former authors. Also, Weber 
investigates the meaning of the German word ‚Beruf ‘ (profession) by making exclu-
sive reference to a particular passage in Luther’s translation of the Bible.4 Weber 
himself states that Luther’s concept of Beruf does not correspond to the modern 
usage of the term. Additional sources would then have been preferable. However, 
this is apparently not Steinert’s most important objection to the Weber’s thesis. 
Weber’s whole research question, according to Steinert, has been formulated with so 
much caution and so many reservations, and the fundamental concepts of capitalist 
spirit and profession with such a lack of clarity, that it is not apparent what Weber 
has actually set out to investigate.
If the capitalist spirit is reduced to an ethical principle prescribing the duty of 
disciplined and regular work, and the relationship between Protestantism and capi-
talism so unclearly stated, then Weber’s question can receive no answer at all. The 
ideal type of the ascetic Puritans is considered by Steinert a piece of Weber’s own 
imagination.5 Weber himself was unsure as to whether theological texts had any 
influence on conducts. He preferred to rely on written advice dispensed by Pro-
testant Ministers to their parishioner, considering the great influence religion then 
exerted on the individual consciences. As Steinert points out, however, the existence 
of such an influence can be assumed, as Weber does, but cannot be proved. For, 
frugality and discipline is not necessarily produced only by the Protestant Ethic; it 
may have different origins, such as the Fordist organization of industrial production. 
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Still, Weber was (in Steinert’s opinion) interested not in the workers’ economic ethic, 
but rather in that of the entrepreneurs and managers.
Workers have shown with strikes and in other ways their opposition to the capi-
talist work ethic. What is more, Weber himself in his Munich lessons on econo-
mic history has pointed to a number of different factors accounting for Western 
capitalist development. Therefore, Weber has performed no empirical investigations 
on the historical origin of capitalism or of the Protestant Reform. Rather, he has 
conducted a theological research on the differences between Lutheran and Puri-
tan Protestantism, pursuing a number of different aims: a reply to theses put for-
ward in Sombart’s Modern Capitalism; a contribution to an oppositional movement 
to the Lutheran Protestant Church, and also to Bismarck’s end of the so-called Kul-
turkampf against the Catholic Church; an essay on asceticism and self-discipline; an 
explanation of England’s superior achievements; and finally, a diagnosis of cultural 
life in Prussia at the end of the 19th century.
Weber’s discourse – Steinert concludes – cannot serve so many different research 
goals, the relevance of which, furthermore, is asserted rather than persuasively 
argued. For instance, the discipline of both the labor force and the manufacturers 
can be accounted for by coercion exerted on labor in the workshop and the compe-
tition constrains on the manufacturers, in addition to the functional needs of large-
scale enterprises. Steinert takes then issue with the Weberian notion of Calvinist 
asceticism as opposed to Lutheran Protestantism, but also to the teaching of the 
Catholic Church. As he contends, this notion should be distinguished from Calvin’s 
own doctrine; but also from Calvinist asceticism, as a consequence of the doctrine 
of predestination. Weber presupposes that the asceticism of the Calvinist sects is 
something entirely different from the asceticism of the Catholic cloisters. Steinert 
holds a different view. 
Weber – he maintains – has overestimated the importance of cloisters as sour-
ces of morality and discipline for the elite of the Catholic faithful; but he has unde-
restimated the sacrament of the Confession as a source of moral guidance to the 
average Catholic. Steinert objects, furthermore, to Weber’s thesis of a direct influ-
ence of Protestantism on capitalism by uniforming life styles; and also by encoura-
ging saving propensity. Accordingly, the uniformity of life styles may be found in 
a variety of different historical phenomena; the propensity to saving can be found 
only among small-business owners who are forced to reduce their consumptions 
because of competition. In neither case Protestant religion plays any role. Steinert 
also objects to the remarks Weber made on the continuous importance of Calvi-
nist Protestantism in the United States as a source of mutual trust and social capital. 
These benefits – he argues – can be obtained by other means, such as joining 
associations that are not religiously characterized. Moreover, in past times the pre-
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destination doctrine provided legitimation to local authorities in America to perse-
cute, even with death penalty, those whose conduct was considered sinful and sub-
versive. Steinert has also raised some methodological issues, which bear on ideal 
types as a methodological instrument, and on Weber’s logic of causal explanations. 
Attention is especially paid to the Weber’s epistemological contribution insofar as 
the construction of ideal types is concerned. Steinert remarks in this connection 
that, on the one hand, the construction of models is necessary to the pursuit of all 
knowledge, as Kant had already argued, so there is nothing new in Weber’s episte-
mological assumptions. On the other hand, Weber’s notion of cultural values, as pro-
viding a selection criterion of the subject matter, leaves out the issue of how power 
influences this selection, and therefore which concepts and models are employed, 
and how they are. 
What is more, Weber employs such a plurality of models and metaphors of cau-
sality, that a reconstruction of concrete examples of causal dependence becomes dif-
ficult. A case in point is the causal connection between the Protestant ethic and the 
spirit of capitalism. The connection is described not as a causally adequate relation-
ship, but as an elective affinity, which is a metaphor borrowed from chemistry. This 
metaphor derives from the conception of the bourgeois individual. Other historical 
relations between these phenomena are also plausible, however; therefore, the elec-
tive-affinity metaphor precludes a rigorous proof of their causal connection, and 
is unsuitable to a structural inquiry into what historical forces operate without the 
actors’ awareness. The afore-mentioned relationship has been often misunderstood 
in several ways. One instance would be the contention that Protestants are more 
industrious and disciplined than Catholics, and therefore the Protestant countries 
are economically more successful than the Catholic. 
In fact, as Steinert maintains, Weber’s whole research project is more complex, 
and cannot be formulated in these terms. Weber has attempted to clarify it in other 
writings, in which this thesis is reiterated; he added, however, a consideration of the 
social, economic, and technical-scientific contexts in which the capitalist spirit ori-
ginated. As the Weber thesis stands, it has been – according to Steinert – so unclearly 
formulated that it cannot be refuted on empirical grounds; for any objection may be 
countered with the remark that the thesis has not been properly understood. Protes-
tant inner-world asceticism, as Weber employs the term, can mean a God-pleasing 
life conduct, but also renouncement of body pleasure or comfort. Also, Weber has 
used the concept of rationality in a variety of ways. As a consequence, the secondary 
literature has variously interpreted its meaning. 
As for the Weber-Troeltsch relationship, Steinert opines that Weber focused on 
the origins of modern capitalism; whereas Troeltsch was rather interested in modern 
culture and in the Enlightenment in particular. These two authors, however, concur-
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red in imputing to Protestantism an important, though not unique, role in produ-
cing the modern individualistic culture through a life conduct connoted by intra-
world asceticism. Steinert also touches in this connection on the polemical exchange 
Weber and Troeltsch had with the German historian Felix Rachfahl and the philoso-
pher Karl Fischer. These two scholars attacked them by questioning their historical 
knowledge, and therefore the validity of their Protestant ethic thesis. Steinert gives 
more space to the replies of Weber, than of Troeltsch, in his summary account of this 
discussion, and points to its inconclusive result.
More recent secondary literature, both qualitative and qualitative, on the Weber-
Troeltsch thesis is then assessed. Steinert observes that this thesis can be hardly cor-
roborated by current interpretations of, or empirical research on, it; for the thesis has 
been variously interpreted, and cannot be operationalized anyway. Steinert dwells in 
this connection on some of the best-known critical contributions to the debate, such 
as those by Tawney and Robertson, and also on some of the replies to their critical 
remarks. These replies are not found persuasive, as they fail (in Steinert’s judgment) 
to show that the Protestant prescriptions on the proper life conduct were actually 
followed not only by the powerful, but by ordinary people as well, and that there-
fore Protestants were more than others inclined to pursue entrepreneurial activities. 
Even if they were so inclined, it does not follow therefrom that laboriousness and a 
concept of one’s activity as a profession (Beruf) were not to be found among Catho-
lics.
They were in fact – Steinert contends – found among them, as had already been 
conclusively shown by the 1940’s, though historical research has continued there-
after. Steinert mentions in this regard Fanfani, Barbalet, Hamilton, Marshall, and 
Trevor-Roper. None of these authors has given unqualified endorsement to the 
Weber-Troeltsch thesis, deemed to be based on ill-founded speculation. Research, 
which purportedly supports this thesis, does not achieve this result. For, this relies 
on religious texts, which by themselves are not in this sense adequate; laborious-
ness, furthermore, is also compatible with a traditional life style, which Weber 
himself does not causally relate to the rise of capitalism; and trust, rather than inner-
world asceticism, promotes capitalism. What is more, historical investigations have 
shown that by the late seventeenth century the predestination doctrine was no lon-
ger an object of faith, and that Weber’s spirit of capitalism was nowhere to be found. 
Accordingly, in the light of historical research Calvinist or Puritan Protestantism 
may then have had at most an irrelevant residual influence on the rise of capitalism. 
Steinert provides then a brief outline of a research program, which Weber might 
have followed if he had lived longer (this program would have presumably inclu-
ded the completion of Economy and Society). The reception of his writings has been 
marked by Parsons’ English translation of the Protestant Ethic and by the Weber-
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inspired (and excessively emphasized, in Steinert’s opinion) thesis of Western ratio-
nalism as a condition to successful capitalism. Steinert wonders if this thesis would 
have been so well-known without Parsons’ support. Other important sources of con-
temporary Weberian scholarship have also been Schluchter, Tenbruck, and Haber-
mas along with the other representatives of the Frankfurt school. The Journal of 
Classical Sociology and Max Weber Studies are also mentioned in this connection. 
Weber’s consolidated reputation as a classical author has brought about his incor-
poration into the culture industry; and therefore the practice, which Steinert deplo-
res, to quote his works even when it is not necessary. The theme of Western ratio-
nalism became prominent, as Steinert maintains with reference to Schluchter and 
Eisenstadt, only in Weber’s last years, and its current relevance has been the result of 
Parsons’ interpretation of Weber, according to Steinert.
The Weberian concepts of ideal type and elective affinity have never been clearly 
defined, and now have an historical interest only. The Protestant Ethic is a text the 
significance of which can be understood if placed in the historical context provided 
by the intellectual milieu of Vienna at the turn of the nineteenth century. Vienna‘s 
multi-cultural milieu was dominated by a class-conscious bourgeoisie and a Freud-
ian conception of the person. It was accordingly opposed to Berlin’s, which was 
under the political hegemony of the aristocracy, but also to Heidelberg, in which 
the ideal of the ascetic personality prevailed. The liberalism of the bourgeoisie, of 
which Weber was a representative, was challenged in Berlin and Vienna by the ram-
pant anti-Semitism and anti-liberalism of the uneducated masses. Heidelberg, in 
Steinert’s view, provided an alternative to both cities. The life-style theme, so impor-
tant in the Protestant Ethic, was represented at the turn of the 19th century in Vienna 
by the ideal of artist life as well as Freud’s psychoanalysis, with its stress on individu-
als and their psychic mechanisms, super-egos, and impulses. Weber’s own life-style 
was less connoted by a conflict between his super-ego and impulses than by a strong 
asceticism, the absence of which he lamented in his German fatherland along with 
a lack of political education. In his mind, Germany was a country that had never 
had a proud class-conscious bourgeoisie imbued with the Protestant ethic, and the 
ideal of profession as a life conduct. This absence was indicated by the propensity 
of the German bourgeoisie to conduct an existence of rentier capitalist, rather than 
one of active entrepreneurs or of politicians with a vocation. Traditional capitalism, 
in other words, had prevailed in Germany over what Weber called the spirit of capi-
talism. 
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A discussion of Steinert’s work in the light of some literature on the 
Weber-Troeltsch thesis
Steinert’s above-presented work raises a number of different issues. They share a cri-
tical appraisal of the so-called Weber-Troeltsch thesis6 on the rise of Western capita-
lism. These issues may be summarized as follows:
a)  The unclear and inconsistent formulation of this thesis makes it irrefutable. To 
this lack of clarity and consistency has contributed the fuzziness of the concepts 
of ideal type and elective affinity, even though Weber has relied on these con-
cepts to maintain the existence of a causal relationship between Protestant ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism; 
b)  the thesis is also objectionable on methodological grounds; 
c)  the contention that a capitalist spirit has ever existed may be disputed for philo-
logical and substantive reasons. Moreover, Weber’s choice of Franklin, rather the 
Fugger, as close to the ideal type of individuals permeated by such a spirit is inap-
propriate; 
d)  ascetic tendencies may be found, outside of Puritan Protestantism, also in Catho-
licism. At any rate, a disciplined life conduct, which according to Weber is cha-
racteristic of modern capitalism, has more persuasive explanations which are not 
based on religion; Weber himself has pointed in other texts to non-religious fac-
tors accounting for the rise of capitalism; 
e)  the vast secondary literature on the Weber-Troeltsch thesis has rejected or 
strong ly qualified it, or – when it has supported it – has done so with inadequate 
arguments; 
f)  of the two capitals of the German-speaking world, it was Vienna, an intellectual 
bourgeois city, rather than Berlin, still dominated by the aristocracy, that best 
suited Weber’s life style of a class-conscious bourgeois. 
These points will be now briefly discussed, starting with the allegedly irrefutable 
character of the Weber-Troeltsch thesis (hereafter referred to simply as the Weber 
thesis).
a) An unclear and inconsistent formulation of the Weber thesis? 
The variety of its interpretations since its first formulation, at the onset of the past 
century,7 may indicate a lack of clarity of this thesis. It also indicates, however, that 
the Protestant Ethic has maintained an enduring interest to this day. Along these 
lines, it has been stated that “the number of papers”, which Sociological Analysis has 
abstracted and which address the Protestant Ethic, “has never been higher, at least 
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insofar as the ones written in English”.8 The Weber thesis may then not have been 
formulated with perfect clearness, but generations of scholars have found it stimula-
ting to this day. By putting forward different interpretations and evaluations in their 
disputes, they have implied that the thesis can be refuted or confirmed, and that is 
accordingly far from non confutable.
Steinert was familiar with Weber’s replies to his early critics Fisher and Rach-
fahl.9 It would indeed be surprising if Steinert had not been, for Weberian scholar-
ship has dwelt extensively on these replies.10 Weber made a sustained effort to cla-
rify his Protestant Ethic thesis after it first came out in the form of scholarly artic-
les, which elicited the criticisms of Fischer and Rachfahl. His effort was apparently 
not quite successful, as previously stated. Still, his fundamental thesis seems clear 
enough: firstly, the new inner-worldly ascetic spirit, which originated from Puritan 
religious life, and from a religiously conditioned family tradition and life style, made 
the life conducts of those who were imbued with it compliant in with the requests 
of early modern capitalism;11 further, the typical representatives of this Puritan con-
ception of life were the members of the rising bourgeois middle classes who were 
carriers of an ascetic conception of life;12 finally, and as a consequence, the acqui-
sition of wealth by means of disciplined work became fully legitimated, paving the 
way to the rise of capitalism.13
b) Is the thesis objectionable on methodological grounds? 
The substantial amount of exegetic effort spent to clarify the meaning of the con-
cepts of ideal type and elective affinity indicates that these Weberian concepts have 
not been considered so vague that they cannot be put into use. Steinert, unfortuna-
tely, was not thoroughly familiar with the literature bearing on these concepts, even 
when it would have been quite relevant for his discussion of the Protestant Ethic. In 
particular, Steinert cited Burger’s study on Weber’s theory of concept formation;14 
but he neglected to mention further important exegetic sources. Among others, 
those by Swedberg, Turner and Factor, and Weiss might have been cases in point.15 
Swedberg has brought light on the causal connection which Weber posited between 
the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, and the evidence he produced to 
support his thesis.16 According to other interpreters of Weber,17 the ideal type of the 
Protestant Ethic may render scientific services by clarifying the meaning of religious 
actions in this particular historical case. These services would be provided even if 
historical reality diverged from this ideal type, as Steinert has contended.18 
Steinert, moreover, did not make full use of the literature he quoted and pre-
sumab ly knew. Reference is made in this connection to the previously mentioned 
25ÖZG 23 | 2012 | 3
Burger’s study on Weber’s epistemology; and also to Howe’s article on Weber’s con-
cept of elective affinities.19 Steinert preferred to disregard Burger’s detailed methodo-
logical indications on how an ideal type should be constructed according to Weber.20 
As for Weber the ideal type is a very special model, used in the social sciences for 
heuristic purposes of their own, it should not be confused, as Steinert apparently 
does, with any scientific model. The procedure of formulating an ideal type in no 
way, furthermore, leaves out generalizations that bear on power constrains. Burger 
provides two examples of how social scientists formulate a generalization in situa-
tions in which there are power and normative constrains: “a) in politics, individuals 
try to optimize their control over others; b) when undergoing changes in social sta-
tus, people seek refuge in radical ideologies”.21
Moreover, the concept of elective or inner affinities (Wahlverwandtschaften) 
is a metaphor, which Weber employed to illustrate the relation he had established 
be tween the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, as Steinert has correctly 
pointed out. Steinert’s narrow interpretation of this metaphorical term is debata-
ble, however. This term should not be construed as to merely indicate “an impor-
tant instrument of knowledge” on the relation “between the Puritan and the capi-
talist conception of work”.22 Weber borrowed the term, according to Howe, from 
Goethe, Kant, and eighteenth-century chemistry.23 Elective affinities bind social 
actors who share “the university of the meanings to which those actors orient their 
actions”. While intersection of meanings makes their interactions possible, interac-
tions choices are bound by the inner affinities of such meanings. Accordingly, “the 
actors’ choices of possible actions are given by the elective affinities of their universe 
of meanings”. In the case of Calvinist Protestantism, elective affinities are premised 
on a common language between the Reformation work ethic and its faith.24
The existence of such affinities is accordingly not simply a matter of plausibility, as 
Steinert has it,25 but must be rather shown persuasively. The methodological assess-
ments of Weber’s Protestant Ethic, though not consistent, have been generally spea-
king not as negative as Steinert’s. An early methodological evaluation called atten-
tion to a fundamental ambiguity of the key proposition of the Weber thesis, and has 
argued, in line with Steinert, that this ambiguity has produced “much confusion”. For, 
its title contains four elements (Protestantism, ethic, spirit, and capitalism). While the 
first couple of elements is somehow related to the second couple, the author wonder ed 
what causal relationship is the object of inquiry if each element of the first couple is 
considered in its relationship to each element of the second couple.26
Moreover, the Weber thesis has also been considered ambiguous because it “per-
mits conflicting interrogations” of the text, and the past practices it refers to. These 
interrogations bear on whether the causal factors were the social-psychological con-
ditions of the Protestant faithful, or rather the social organization of the Protestant 
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life.27 It should be remarked, however, that Weber’s fundamental thesis, as previously 
presented in a condensed form, causally relates two ideal types, the Protestant ethic 
as embodied in consistent life practices, and the spirit of capitalism; rather than their 
conceptual components when separately considered. As is the case with ideal types 
in general, in this case, too, “certain empirical phenomena are grouped together and 
named by the same term”.28 The construction of this ideal type has been, generally 
speaking, considered a methodological achievement on the part of Weber. 
 “The vigor and subtlety”, and also the brilliance, with which the ideal-typical has 
been applied by Weber’s Protestant Ethic, have been emphasized by a contemporary 
author.29 Another methodological evaluation also praised the “brilliant insights” 
contained therein.30 Along similar lines, Weber’s “superior grasp of the methodo-
logical problems which he had to face” has been stressed. Weber’s methodologi-
cal achievements remain to this day, it has been argued, despite the “fundamen-
tal change” which “the logic of science has undergone”.31 As for the ideal type of 
the capitalist spirit, the comments of Dirk Kaesler – a reputed Weber scholar – on 
the early and subsequent reception of the Weber thesis seem to apply well also to 
Steinert’s contention that this spirit is nowhere to be found as a motivation source of 
capitalist development. This sort of criticism only shows, according to Kaesler, the 
critics’ lack of knowledge and understanding of Weber’s ideal type.32
c) Has a capitalist spirit ever existed? Is Benjamin Franklin a good instantiation of 
this spirit? 
Whether Franklin, rather the Fugger, was close to the ideal type of individuals per-
meated by such a spirit has been discussed in Gordon Marshall’s balanced apprai-
sal of the Weber thesis.33 Marshall has raised a number of points, some of which are 
critical of the Weber thesis. In particular, as Marshall remarks, the Weber thesis is 
affected by a fundamental ambiguity; for, it is not apparent whether Weber’s object 
of inquiry was the relationship between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capi-
talism, or rather the relevance of this spirit as one factor among others of the rise of 
capitalism.34 However, Marshall does not criticize Weber’s thesis, as Steinert does, on 
the ground that the great cautiousness and the many reservations with which Weber 
conducted his investigation, and the lack of clarity with which his ideal type of the 
spirit of capitalism was formulated, make his research question unintelligible. The 
thesis has been variously interpreted, often considered contentious and in need of 
clarification;35 but not deemed unintelligible on these or other grounds.  
Steinert, as will be recalled, took issue in particular with Weber’s portrait of Ben-
jamin Franklin as a representative of the Protestant ethic, having introduced “a stern 
27ÖZG 23 | 2012 | 3
and honest morality into economic life”;36 and suggested that the Catholic Fugger 
would provide a better instance. Steinert was not the first scholar to make this point 
as it had been previously raised by other authors, in Weber’s own time and there-
after.37 It has been observed, however, that Weber accurately perceived in Frank-
lin an “ethically infused spirit as rooted in the soil of earlier Protestant asceticism”, 
which no longer had “its religious hull”.38 If Franklin’s life style had evidenced the 
pursuit of gain without ethical or religious constrains, as Steinert has contended, 
it would be difficult to understand why Franklin kept a daily moral bookkeeping 
in order to develop his character and use time efficiently.39 This practice was cus-
tomary among the Puritans of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.40 In cont-
rast to Steinert, but in accordance with Weber, this fact provides evidence that the 
methodical attitude of the Puritan life style “introduced a stern and honest morality 
into economic life”.41
As Weber argued, the secular life style of Franklin’s times indicated that, in 
the United States at least, “The pursuit of gain […] has become most completely 
unchained and stripped of its religious-ethical meaning”. Contemporary capitalism 
has taken a further step in the direction of secularism, for it does not need “asceti-
cism as a supporting pillar”.42 As for the Fugger family of bankers, Weber considered 
their activities, along with those of the great Florentine bankers, as an instance of “a 
purely political undertaking”. This sort of undertaking, as Weber saw it, was beset 
by extreme uncertainty and very high risks.43 It was therefore incompatible with “a 
sober and systematic approach to life”, such as Franklin’s.44
  
d) May ascetic tendencies be found outside of Puritan Protestantism? 
As Weber argued, anticipating Steinert’s objections, Catholicism outside of the 
monastic communities failed to provide “specific psychological premiums for the 
ascetic regulation of life”.45 For, “the Catholic’s good works and duties were surely 
not of necessity rationalized into a life-system”, remaining rather “a series of isola-
ted actions that the faithful could carry out as the situation required”.46 Precisely the 
Catholic sacrament of the confession provided an instance of such a series of isola-
ted actions on the part of the faithful, by means of which they received from an out-
side source – the priest – authoritarian guidance for their life conducts. “The syste-
matization of a life organized around ethical principles, as common to both Calvi-
nist Protestant asceticism and the rational forms of life within the Catholic monastic 
orders”,47 was not present among most Catholic faithful.
Other sources of industriousness, uniformity of life styles and a disciplined life 
conduct, such as business competition and the Fordist organization of industrial 
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production, were absent before the rise of capitalism, and cannot therefore have con-
tribute to it origin and initial development. Traditionalism, moreover, was adverse 
to rational capitalism, and did not therefore possess some causal elements which 
were, according to Weber, of crucial importance for the rise of modern capitalism;48 
namely, “the necessity of testifying to one’s belief in this-worldly vocational calling”, 
and also “a positive motivation toward asceticism upon broader strata of persons 
endowed with religiously oriented natures”.49
  
e) A more comprehensive explanation of the rise of capitalism? 
Weber’s explanation of the rise of capitalism is broader than the so-called Weber 
thesis, as Steinert himself correctly remarks.50 Weber himself has pointed in other 
texts to non-religious factors accounting for the rise of capitalism. As some inter-
preters have persuasively argued, this explanation is nonlinear; for, any linear expla-
nation stressing one factor only, whether religious or not, “distorts Weber’s posi-
tion”,51 and should be accordingly avoided. Rather, this explanation is multicausal 
and complex,52 and also includes economic, political-institutional, and social con-
ditions. It has been the object of scholarly inquiry, and also of a few reconstruction 
attempts,53 which have apparently escaped Steinert’s attention.
f ) Has the secondary literature on the Weber- Troeltsch thesis rejected or strongly 
qualified it, or – when it has supported it – has done so with inadequate arguments? 
Steinert touches, it will be recalled, on the secondary literature concerning the so-
called Weber-Troeltsch thesis. Its reception and discussion have been in some cases 
conducted by authors who, like Steinert, cannot claim any special competence as 
experts on theology or history of religion. There is, on the other hand, no question 
on the expertise in these fields of Troeltsch, who was a professor of theology at Hei-
delberg, but also of Weber himself.54 The Weber-Troeltsch thesis has been debated 
to this day. Still, even some authors who have objected to it on several grounds have 
concluded that Weber’s interpretation of the Protestant ethic is empirically plausi-
ble and acceptable in principle, though it cannot be considered as demonstrated.55 
Also, recent critics have qualified the Weber thesis, rather than outright rejecting it. 
Quali fication is, of course, not synonymous with rejection. Finally, objections on the 
part of some scholars have been met with replies which seem persuasive on the part 
of scholars who are at least equally competent.56
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g) A bourgeois cultural hegemony in Vienna? 
Finally, Steinert has made the quite dubious assertions that in Vienna a class-con-
scious bourgeoisie exerted cultural hegemony in Vienna at the turn of the nine-
teenth century; and that Vienna’s life style and intellectual environment was espe-
cially consonant with Weber. Liberalism in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, espe-
cially in Vienna, had been challenged by reactionary, anti-Semitic and anti-liberal 
Catholics such as the political leaders Schönerer and Lueger, and by other powerful 
and hostile forces. Their hostility to bourgeois liberalism and to Vienna’s intellectual 
milieu was uncompromising. These far-right forces were active in civil and politi-
cal society. Karl Lueger, the anti-Semitic politician, represented them in the Parlia-
ment and the local government. Lueger had the support of different social classes, 
including part of the aristocracy.57 The Emperor’s veto against Lueger and his party, 
which held the majority of votes in the Parliament,58 could not forestall these forces, 
or limit their power. 
Weber spent a relatively short period in Vienna in the autumn 1917 and spring 
1918. He enjoyed the beauty and the cultural life of the city – “the culture-laden 
human atmosphere”59 – without however taking full advantage of scholarly encoun-
ters there. Vienna could not offer him “a homeland”, as he put it; for, in his wife 
Marianne’s words, “Weber definitely belonged to Germany”.60 Even disregarding the 
fundamental political-institutional differences between the German and the Aust-
rian Hungarian States, to which Weber himself called attention,61 he could hardly fit 
into Austria as a liberal Protestant. For, Austria had become in the first decades of 
the past century a Catholic, anti-Semitic, and non-Liberal society. By then, Vienna‘s 
cultural milieu was no longer dominated by a class-conscious bourgeoisie, the social 
class to which he felt to belong. Weber, moreover, disliked the Freudian movement, 
which he largely identified with Otto Gross. Gross was Freud’s unorthodox pupil 
whose ethical ideas Weber had found completely unacceptable.62
Instead, Weber drew a large and attentive audience in Heidelberg, where he was 
the influential leader of a circle of intellectuals. As “the mythos of Heidelberg”, his 
only competitor there was the poet Stefan George, whose circle intersected with 
Weber’s.63 It is not therefore apparent at all in what sense Vienna could have provi-
ded a “wider context”64 to Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis, even if only in the sense 
of a distinct cultural and political context. The available historical evidence suggests 
rather that Weber was not interested in Vienna as a foil to his thesis, but merely 
sought to enjoy whatever the city had to offer him from a cultural viewpoint. 
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